The Jinan Intermediate People's Court adjudicated the charges of bribery, embezzlement and abuse of power against Mr. Bo Xilai, the former Communist Party Chief of Chongqing from August 22 to 26, 2013. Bo was charged of accepting a luxury villa located in Cannes from a tycoon named Xu Ming. A conspiracy named the Montage scheme, which used offshore companies in the purpose of committing bribery and covering the beneficiary of the property abroad, emerged during the trial. With focus on the role of the offshore companies played in financing function, fake business transactions, ownership structure related to the Cannes villa, this paper is trying to answer a couple of questions: what's the time of accepting cash bribe paralleling with money laundering through a group of offshore companies, the time when the money was firstly transferred from the bribe-giver to the bribe-taker or the time when the bribe-taker became the beneficiary or controller of the assets purchased with the money? In finding out the beneficiary of a property under the name of an offshore company, is it legally required and technically possible to prove the consistence between the owner of a property and that of an offshore company?
Firstly, offshore companies are incorporated under special corporate law promulgated by so called offshore financial centers such as Cayman Islands, Bermuda, British Virgin Islands and so on. Those former colonial islands deliberately attract corporations to domicile in their jurisdiction by racing to the bottom in terms of deregulation and tax reduction. In return, the revenue generated by local financial service as well as by registration administration substantially awards local economy. In other words, special corporate law for offshore companies itself functions as a legal product for profit making. Secondly, choosing offshore jurisdiction as a company's domicile is not aimed to gain capacity for doing business there. Some companies are incorporated to realize special purposes which could be legal or at least in grey area such as tax inversions, while others created for covering criminal activities like money laundering. No matter what the exact purpose offshore companies serve for, the conventional legal wisdom that the domicile of a company is the location of its headquarter and the place where main business is carried on is falsified (Company Law, 2013) .
Thirdly, originally a corporate is created to do business legally, but an offshore company will neither do any business nor limit its activities within the definition of legality. Barack Obama regards offshore company as an alienation to the company law, "there's always going to be illicit movement but we shouldn't make it legal" (Obama, 2016) .
The idea of corporate law for offshore companies seems to share a common feature with Delaware's corporation code, both of them lure investors to incorporate in their jurisdiction by offering company laws up to bottom (Romano, 1987) . However, interstate activities involving companies, for example trade of shares, are subject to federal laws, in most circumstances the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934. With regards to offshore companies, the situation is different. If investors move across the boundaries of jurisdictions under the shell of offshore companies, the sovereignty itself forms the barrier preventing the law enforcement from one jurisdiction to another.
The multiple nationalities can be used to reach legal purpose or get benefits from activities within grey area, for instance it is not unusual for a company to get foreign status in order to take advantage of favorable tax treatment. The further an investor goes beyond his mother country, the more difficult for the domestic law enforcement reaches him. As a result, offshore companies are much easier to be manipulated in doing illegal activities such as money laundering, giving bribes and trafficking.
In the case of Bo Xilai (hereinafter referred as Mr. Bo), the court convicted Mr. Bo of taking a bribe in the form of a luxury villa located in Cannes valued at €2.32 million (approximately 16, 249, 709 RMB) . The information emerging from the adjudication implies that several offshore companies were used as vehicles for money laundering purpose by opening deposit accounts under the names of companies in various jurisdictions as well as obfuscating the link between the money and the target asset. The above mentioned process is regarded by Mr. Pa-J. Fang trick Heri Devillers (hereinafter referred as Mr. Devillers, who is also the designer of that scheme and the witness against Mr. Bo), as the Montage scheme composed of a channel of cash flow, access of secrecy layers, and a structure of internal control. From the perspective of the prosecutor, to find out the real owner behind the Cannes villa is fundamental for establishing a concrete link between the ownership of that real estate, the source of its financing and the defendant. Taking into consideration the involvement of money laundering in this case, the exact time of accepting bribe is essential for targeting the suspect of bribe-taker. Whether the money was used for gambling or for obtaining a real estate after the acceptance of bribe seems not very relevant. If the charge of money laundering had been raised, the starting point of money laundering would be identical with the time of bribery. Why the prosecutor failed to pay attention to seemingly apparent fact of money laundering? For the purpose of convicting the bribery in terms of cash, is it legally required and technically possible to locate the real owner of the property as the final outcome resulted from spending the money?
2.
Step One of the Montage Scheme: Russell Properties S.A.
Hub of Funding and Ultimate Share Holder
Money laundering through offshore companies usually start with an offshore bank account as the entrance for any outflow of money from domestic juris- The idea to own a property in France was not originally from Ms. Gu but from Mr. Devillers, a trusted friend of Ms. Gu, instead. Mr. Devillers may described a vision appealing to Gu: two-hour flight to London, where Gu's son was at that time attending his high school, made Cannes a convenient location for Gu; and a villa with potential to generate rental income put added value to this plan (Court Records, 2013).
Taking Mr. Devillers' advice to buy a house in France implies that Ms. Gu had great trust in Devillers. However, as the story unfolded, it turned out that Mr.
Devillers might take advantage of Ms. Gu to control the network of offshore companies and the Cannes villa, which will be demonstrated as below. Act (1990) . In BVI, the nominee shareholder is also a licensed business usually provided by the "registered agent". From the name list of quite a few unrelated third parties (institutions or individuals), the registered agent could pick up one or more nominees for its client. The nominees' commitment to the beneficial owners is usually recorded in a trust declaration in which the nominees confirm that their obligations to hold shares on behalf of the beneficial owners, and all the rights including but not limited to claiming interests and disposing the shares exclusively belong to the beneficial owners. This trust declaration is privileged, not required to be enclosed in the incorporation file. This trust declaration is confidential document which is not required to be enclosed in the incorporation files.
Each of Gu and Devillers
Checked with BVI laws and regulations relating nominee shareholders as well as the ownership structure of Russell Properties, the testimonies of Ms. Gu and Mr. Devillers seem to be doubtful in several aspects. There is no evidence showing that Mr. Devillers was licensed to act as a custodian in BVI. Moreover, the transfer of bearer shares is highly restricted in BVI. A valid transfer of bearer shares requires for registration of the new beneficiary's name and address at the company's registered office, and delivering of share certificates itself could not naturally lead to a change of ownership. Interestingly, such practice contradicts the stereotype of bearer shares held by Chinese legal academia for over one hundred years, an understanding derived from the imitation of Japanese law that whoever presents bearer shares owns the company, and transfer of the ownership of shares is simply completed by delivering the share certificates (Lai, 1983) . There is no evidence showing that Mr. Devillers was licensed to act as a custodian in BVI, or there is no need to invite two nominees.
There may be another possibility that names of nominees and the equity ratio were recorded in the Articles of Association without issuing any physical share certificate, which contributes no substantial difference in the case of registered shares discussed above. As offshore companies are frequently abused as an instrument to cover up the truth, it is questionable to what extent we can find truth through collecting and analysing their registration information. From the point of view of the author, the reference to either registration information or the witness' testimony afterwards can hardly be reliable per se in finding the "real owner" behind an offshore company. Instead of being trapped in a deliberately designed network composed of offshore companies, this paper recommends an observation of wide angle, accepting registration information and testimony concerning offshore companies only if they can be supported by other stronger evidences. A probe into the cash flow in the channel set by offshore companies could be an effective way to provide such evidences. Literally, money laundering refers to those tricks for purifying proceeds from illegal sources. When comes to its legal definition, the consensus will be soon replaced by diverse meanings. For example, the U.S. Money Laundering Control Act (1986) covers proceeds generated by almost all crimes. By contrast, money laundering in Chinese Criminal Code targets only limited criminal activities such as drug-related crimes, organizational crime of gangs, terrorism, smuggling, corruption or bribery, disturbing financial system, and financial frauds.
Despites the differences of legal definition, offshore companies are playing a crucial role of globalized money laundering activities. In the case of Bo, instead of raising the charge of money laundering against the defendant, the prosecutor narrowed his attention on the charge of bribery making all his efforts to reconstruct Bo's connection with Russell Properties and Cannes Villa. But the prosecutor underestimated the difficulties he was confronted with. In this case, money laundering and bribery are closely connected: without money laundering, the bribery could not be started, completed or shielded; without taking money laundering into consideration, it is hard to pick up the bribe-taker covered by a network of offshore companies. Instead, with money laundering kept in mind, the bribery would emerge from the layers provided by Montage scheme. 2) How was the money "legally" transformed into a holiday house in France?
3) How did offshore finance services cover up real beneficiaries of property abroad?
4) Why so many companies and wealthy families are enthusiastic followers of offshore companies during China's economic transition? How does the offshore company draw massive outflows from China?
The above four questions are all relevant to money flows through offshore companies which is named as the Montage scheme in this case. 1) Fake business deal. In order to make the remittance look like an ordinary business deal, Sidelong and Eastern American forged a trade which had never happened. According to the testimony of a witness from Sidelong, the contract was even backdated, an implication for the conspiracy after the L/C was issued.
Cash Flow from Bank of Communications
2) Forgery. Sidelong and Eastern American collaborated or acted alone to forge the full set of documents required in the L/C including insurance policy, bill of lading, shipping documents and so on. Considering the complexity of forgery, it inevitably left some trace behind such as inconsistence among files.
However, all the banks and professionals involved coincidently ignored the flaws of the documentation.
3) The issuing bank from where importer is located while the nominated bank Money laundering by means of L/C is a bold attempt since every step might leave traceable flaws, but it is learnt from Mr. Bo's case that this method could still work if the regulation is loose or the law enforcement is weak. 
Cash Flows within the

Offshore Company's Function of Secrecy
The increasing importance of the offshore company in global money laundering is highly connected with the secrecy service it provides. Based on ten years of study on money laundering, a UN report states "criminal organizations are making wide use of the opportunities offered by financial havens and offshore centres to launder criminal assets", and "effectively shielding foreign investors from investigations and prosecutions from their home country". The "extensive array of facilities" offered by offshore centres including strict banking secrecy, convenient registration of international business companies or shell companies, nominee shareholders, and trust service. All these "facilities" work together to form secrecy layers where even the clients themselves probably get lost (Blum, et al., 1998) . "Secrecy is the badge of fraud", commented by Justice Millet on the secrecy provided by offshore companies in a judgment of a money laundering case (Hampton & Levi, 1999) .
The Montage Scheme is an archetypal case of money laundering by using "ex- 
Mr Bergmans answered in a telephone interview that his company held shares in
Residences Fontaine St Georges as a nominee at request of an intermediary whose identity he declined to disclose and yet he did not know who the ultimate owner was. The American shareholder was a friend of Mr and Mrs Bergmans who had never involved in the management nor known the existence of this villa (Page, 2013) . Therefore, the relationship between the above mentioned intermediary and Russell Properties remains unknown. Offshore techniques including layers of secrecy, nominee shareholders, custodians for bearer shares and other similar designs work together for a common purpose of dragging "fox hunter" into a jungle hard to make a way out. Even though first hand information about offshore companies involved in Mr. Bo's case was disclosed by Ms. Gu and Mr. Devillers, the identity of the owner of Russell Properties and that of the Cannes villa could not be legally defined beyond doubts as observed in the UN report that "once the money is inside the (offshore) banking system, most of the battle is lost" (Hampton & Levi, 1999) . the money was used to purchase a property or services, or was stolen, it had no relevance to whether Ms. Gu took a bribe or when the bribery was done. However, it remains unclear why the prosecutor failed to pay his attention to prima facie evidence of money laundering (e.g. forged documents for getting a L/C to transfer money out of China) but exclusively focused on the ownerships of offshore companies and the Cannes villa, leading the investigation exactly into the trap set up by the Montage Scheme. As shown in Figure 3 , six foreigners were found out to be the shareholders of the ultimate holding company of the Cannes villa.
Agency Cost of Employing Offshore Companies for Money Laundering
Due to secrecy services, offshore companies are widely used in the transnational money laundering activities. International money laundering is not a one-person job, the beneficiary has to rely on "professional services" offered by various agents for the incorporation, opening offshore accounts, installment of layers, and providing legal cover of illicit assets. As known to all, there have always been risks of agent's loyalty for the agents will act in their own interests rather than the principal's even in legal businesses. Any rational principal would not count on the agent's "professional ethic" in an illegal engagement and it is not hard to imagine the agent would never miss opportunities to take advantage of the principal.
In Mr. Bo's case, Ms. Gu gave her full trust to Mr. Devillers at the very beginning, delegating him the power of designing and operating the scheme of international money laundering. If we trace back the practice of the Montage Scheme, Mr. Devillers' advices to Ms. Gu, either the alleged mandatory requirement for at least two shareholders or the equal division of shares, diverted from Gu's best interests. As the scheme unfolded, Ms. Gu's awareness of the agency costs and deep concerns about losing control were reflected by repeated changed ownership structure of the Cannes villa.
However, Ms Gu's intention to reconstruct the ownership of Russell Properties has never been realized. Her first proposal was to transfer all her shares to tion was that the alienation of agency grew so widely that the situation was soon out of her control. Ms. Gu seemed quite naive in creating a checking and balancing mechanism between her two agents. In a criminal organization, deceit, betrayal and revenge are day-to-day practice among its members because the rule governing principal-agent relationship in this kind of organization is totally out of the reach of law or ethics (Roper, 2012 , Connett, 2015 . The Hollywood style response to dishonesty, for example murder, blackmail, or kidnaping, dramatically occurred in Mr. Bo's case.
Conclusion
Represented by BVI International Business Companies Act, offshore jurisdictions present international legal products including offshore companies and offshore accounts to fulfill the needs for capital mobility. These legal products are not for attracting investments but for providing channels for money flows. Of course, the service is not for free, and the passengers have to pay for their pass.
Compared with its small population of no more than 30,000, 600,000 incorpora- In Mr. Bo's case, the fact whoever is the owner of the Cannes villa is not necessarily relevant to the bribery. The conviction of bribery in giving cash depends on whether the control of the money is transferred from the bribe-giver to the bribe-taker rather than whether the bribe-taker is the owner of any property purchased with the money given by the bribe-giver. When the $3.23 million provided by Mr. Xu Ming entered the offshore account controlled by Ms. Gu on 29 November 2000, the crime of bribery was completed. However, the process of money laundering did not stop. A complete process of money laundering composed of three stages: placement, layering and integration, (Sultzer, 1995 (Sultzer, -1996 and in Mr. Bo's case, the placement was carried out in form of money transfer Deep water flows quietly, the international mobility of money shielded under offshore companies is also a quiet movement. Therefore, the importance of information collection could never be overestimated in checking the growth of offshore companies. The offshore company hides the truth, therefore, mandatory requirement for information disclosure would be a countermeasure. There are two recommended approaches for information collection and exchange.
Collection and Exchange of Over Sea Information
1) Expansion of Exterritorial Effect of Domestic Law: An Approach Represented
by the FCPA. In cracking down bribery overseas in exchange for business, the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977 (hereinafter referred as FCPA) is applied to a wide range of individuals and entities, including U.S. persons and businesses, domestic and foreign companies listed in the U.S., and foreign persons and businesses acting in the territory of the U.S. In other words, the FCPA breaks the traditional boundaries between lexpersonalis and jus soli, and claims a jurisdiction of extraterritoriality. expanding its judicial effect abroad. The FCPA accounting provisions require issuers, senior managers, and controllers to make financial reports and maintain adequate internal control system for the purpose of detecting clues for potential corruptive payments. Although the enforcement of law overseas can not work without an international collaboration, which is the core in difficulty, the enforcement of the FCPA overseas has proved to be a success. From the point view of Deputy Attorney General Sally Quillian Yates, reliable infor-mation contributes significantly to the effective enforcement of FCPA. (Yates, 2015) U.S. Department of Justice and Securities and Exchange Commission (hereinafter referred as SEC) exercise multiple methods to gather information regarding potential FCPA violations including tips from whistleblowers, self reporting and mandatory information disclosure, information discovered in other investigations, referrals from other offices or agencies, public sources (such as media reports and trade publications) and proactive investigative techniques. Although the power of world's largest economy is an important factor for the exterritorial effect of the FCPA which can not be ignored, the FCPA brought forth an innovative approach in terms of collecting information overseas.
2) Establishment of Disclosure and Exchange Mechanism: An Approach of International Cooperation. The offshore company is popular among players engaging in illegal activities because it creates the difficulties for the enforcement of law by duplicating dozens of its egos and then frustrating an international collaboration in terms of law enforcement. As a separate investigation and law enforcement alone can never pierce secrecy layers spreading across jurisdictions, the transnational collaboration in law enforcement is fundamental in fighting against transnational crimes shielded by offshore companies. A significant step has been made by G20 and OECD to end banking secrecy and offshore abuse in 2009, and Global Standard for Automatic Exchange of Financial Account Information in Tax Matters was presented by OECD under the mandate of G20 in 2014. With the execution of the 34 members and 13 non-members the first information exchange is scheduled in 2017. The new standard provides for "annual automatic exchange between governments of financial account information, including balances, interest, dividends, and sales proceeds from financial assets, presorted to governments by financial institutions and covering accounts held by individuals and entities, including trusts and foundations". It is noted that quite a few offshore financial centers such as Switzerland, Luxemburg, Singapore and BVI committed to implement the Standard, implying positive impact of the collective actions of G20 and OECD countries towards offshore abuse. With the exchanges of information becoming regular and going deeper, the ability of law enforcement to identify suspicious offshore accounts and transactions overseas will be substantially enhanced.
Mandatory Information Disclosure by "Destination Country"
Offshore jurisdiction is by no means the final destination for capital outflows.
Money temporarily sleeping offshore will sooner or later leave (the last task of money laundering "integration"). This paper describes the potential final destinations of outflows as "destination countries". Information disclosure for offshore companies could be introduced into laws and regulations in destination countries in order to obtain information covered by offshore secrecy. For example, when an offshore company is engaged in incorporating a local subsidiary, opening a business office, bringing a law suit or making custom clearance in a destination county, it is required to make full disclosure of the articles of association, nominee shareholders, beneficiaries, controllers and related parties. Furthermore, if a group of destination counties could develop common standards for information disclosure associated with exchange mechanism through conventions or agreements, it is possible to penetrate secrecies formed by offshore companies.
